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Abstract
Acquisition experience is commonly viewed as an important determinant of
subsequent acquisition success. Yet, empirical evidence suggests that acquisition
experience may not be positively associated with acquisition performance and
could even hurt performance. In this article, we highlight specific practices that
facilitate and impede learning from acquisitions and draw implications for managers. In
particular, we suggest that managers (1) expand time between acquisitions, (2)
implement strong governance mechanisms and top management team diversity,
(3) use similar-context experience, (4) avoid herding behavior in acquisitions, and
(5) minimize blind reliance on financial advisors to effectively transfer prior
acquisition experience into acquisition success.
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Introduction
Acquisitions are major strategic initiatives allowing the firm to grow, gain access to
valuable assets and know-how, redeploy existing capabilities to new and underexplored
markets, and achieve competitive advantage (see for review, Haleblian et al. 2009).
Evidence shows the volume of global acquisition activities has seen a steady growth
over the last decade with recent statistics showing that 2017 marked the fourth con-
secutive year of annual M&A deals exceeding 3 trillion dollars (Massoudi et al. 2017).
Not surprisingly, acquisitions have received considerable attention by academics and
practitioners. An important question that drives a significant amount of research is fo-
cused on approaches to extract greater acquisition value.
One seemingly obvious factor that should enhance acquisition performance is ac-
quirer acquisition experience. Intuition, as well as theory on organization learning,
suggests firms with more acquisition experience should perform better on their acqui-
sitions than firms with limited acquisition experience. Specifically, it would be expected
that firm managers learn from prior experiences and should encode such experience
into organizational routines and practices (Nelson et al. 1982), which should benefit
firms on subsequent acquisitions. Yet, empirical findings on the relationship between
acquisition experience and acquisition performance show that acquisition experience is
not associated with positive performance and is often even negatively related (see for
review, Barkema and Schijven 2008). This finding suggests that learning from acquisi-
tions is not automatic and is a complicated endeavor (Zollo and Singh 2004; Zollo and
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Winter 2002). Acquisitions are idiosyncratic and distinct from each other, so applying
acquisition experience to a current acquisition may be harmful. Firms assume they can
learn from their experiences and attempt to do so even when those experiences are
likely to be uninformative or otherwise ambiguously related to future decisions (Kardes
et al. 2005). This is akin to the concept of “superstitious learning” from learning theory,
which takes place when the connection between the cause of an action and the out-
comes experienced are misattributed (Levitt and March 1988). Contrary to expectation
for the positive benefits of acquisition experience, then, managers often inappropriately
generalize acquisition experience to subsequent dissimilar acquisitions (Haleblian and
Finkelstein 1999), which often hurts acquisition performance. Empirical findings also
show that experience with prior small related acquisitions is negatively related to
post-deal performance of large acquisitions (Ellis et al. 2011). Hence, if managers have
conducted small, related acquisitions and transfer that experience to subsequent large
deals, the firm loses value.
Although these are discouraging findings, we argue that under specific circumstances
firms can effectively learn from acquisition experience. Specifically, we make the case
that firms should not blindly follow the acquisition experience of external actors. More-
over, firms should emphasize internal arrangements that provide executives with suffi-
cient time, skills, and motivation to diligently apply prior experience to subsequent
acquisitions. We integrate extant research on acquisition experience in order to outline
organizational design practices that facilitate managers to learn more effectively from
acquisition experience.
Practices undermining successful learning from acquisition experience
Herding behaviors
Research outside the context of acquisitions shows that firms benefit from vicarious
learning, which is learning through the observation of other firms’ strategic choices
(Ingram and Baum 1997; Shaver et al. 1997). The vicarious learning rationale behind
these arguments is that a focal firm can explore different ways of conducting tasks
without experiencing the costs and risks associated with experimenting with those tasks
(Miner and Haunschild 1995). In terms of acquisitions, the focal acquirer can observe
and then repeat the acquisition choices of other firms. However, observing others does
not automatically translate into learning because “knowledge does not transfer easily
between organizations” (Baum and Ingram 2002: 5). Trying to follow rivals without un-
derstanding the motives and underlying capabilities behind rivals’ behaviors often dam-
ages the focal firm, especially in contexts of intense competition.
One such context is merger waves (defined as periods of time with increased rate of
activity which is sustained for a limited time period before returning to the previous
level of merger frequency). Over 50% of acquisitions that occurred over the last century
took place in merger and acquisition waves (Stearns and Allan 1996). In fact, the obser-
vation that mergers and acquisitions often occur in waves is one of the “most consistent
empirical features of merger activity” (Andrade et al. 2001: 104). During acquisition
waves, later movers within the wave tend to follow the actions of early movers (Hale-
blian et al. 2012). However, research suggests that follower firms who succumb to com-
petitive pressures and engage in herding behavior by pursuing acquisitions are
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penalized by the market (Carow et al. 2004; McNamara et al. 2008). Thus, in the con-
text of acquisitions, attempting to learn from the experience of other firms carries a
high risk of merger and acquisition failure. To prevent this, firms might design manuals
with detailed instructions and guidance on prioritizing due diligence, and avoid follow-
ing the crowd in acquisition processes.
Relying blindly on financial advisor acquisition experience
It has been speculated that acquirer acquisition experience is unreliable because firms
lack objectivity and would be better served by more objective outside advisors, such as
investment banks. However, research shows that markets are also suspicious of invest-
ment bank acquisition experience and react negatively rather than positively to such ex-
perience (Steinbach, Haleblian & McNamara, WP). A caveat to this finding is that
when investment banks have a significant amount of focused experience in the target
industry, this increases experience relevance and, under such conditions, the effects of
advisor acquisition experience are more likely to become positive.
Research also shows that the degree to which firms follow investment bank recom-
mendations or “discount” that advice and rely instead on their own insights to make
their final decision impacts whether acquisition experience has positive effects (Breh-
mer and Hagafors 1986; Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv 2004). Acquirers
knowledgeable regarding their decision are more likely to discount advice and rely on
their own set of information to make a decision (Godek and Murray 2008; Yaniv 2004;
Yaniv and Choshen-Hillel 2012), which results in better decisions. Research shows that
acquirers pursuing a target in their own industry are equipped with the
industry-specific experience that can contribute to their own decisions and enable them
to discount the advice of their investment advisor. Relatedly, prior research has shown
that related acquisitions perform better than acquisitions of targets in industries in
which the acquiring firm has no prior experience (Morck et al. 1990; Schijven and Hitt
2012; Seth 1990), which provides evidence that such acquirers do not need to rely on
irrelevant experience brought forth by investment advisors. Thus, when assessing in-
vestment banker advice, focused, relevant experience from advisors yields acquisition
benefits, especially when supplemented with own firm experience on related acquisi-
tions. The creation of and adherence to codified tools and manuals (Heimeriks et al.
2012; Zollo and Singh 2004) containing blueprint for balancing financial advisors’ ac-
quisition expertise with firm’s own acquisition experience are likely to lead to successful
application of prior acquisition experience to subsequent acquisition deals.
Practices facilitating successful learning from acquisition experience
Expanding time between acquisitions
There has been a long-standing argument that the time between subsequent acquisi-
tions is of essential importance to the impact of prior acquisition experience on subse-
quent acquisition outcomes (see for review, Shi et al. 2012). Scholars have argued that
when acquisitions are equally paced in time (about 6- to 12-month intervals), managers
are better able to utilize prior experiences to obtain positive acquisition returns (Hay-
ward 2002). If acquisitions are too close to each other and conducted over a short
period of time, it is hard for managers to assess what worked and what did not work in
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prior acquisitions (Haunschild et al. 1994) because they have to jump to the next deal.
If acquisitions are too distant from each other, the inferences from prior deals might be
obsolete or unavailable because people that were engaged in acquisitions have left the
firm (Hayward 2002).
Emerging research is also showing that progressively expanding intervals—when time be-
tween subsequent acquisitions systematically expands over time—might be the most ap-
propriate approach for capturing prior acquisition experience (Bingham et al. 2015b).
Interviews with experienced acquirers show that expanding practice may result in strong
acquisition performance for multiple reasons. First, expanding practice reduces the cogni-
tive overload by providing managers with more time to learn from prior acquisitions and
absorb new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990); as a result, each subsequent deal is
given greater priority and can be conducted more diligently. In addition, expanding prac-
tice can confer benefits of stability by allowing executives to develop rules and routines ne-
cessary for the transfer of collective knowledge on how to conduct acquisitions. Moreover,
expanding practice facilitates preparation and coordination of resources. As time between
deals progressively expands, executives have more opportunities to coordinate the various
functions involved in the acquisition process and thus improve the likelihood of acquisition
success (Bingham et al. 2015a). Finally, increasing time between deals helps the acquiring
firm to integrate and assimilate target firm personnel which is key to capturing synergies
between the two firms (Graebner 2004). Accordingly, the manner in which firms schedule
their acquisitions over time—especially if the time between deals is increasing—appears to
enhance the likelihood of firms benefitting from acquisition experience. Building dedicated
corporate teams from the acquiring and target firms (Bingham et al. 2015b; Kale et al.
2002) provides the necessary human resources to slowly and diligently digest existing ac-
quisition experience and effectively apply it to future acquisition deals.
Drawing on strong governance mechanisms
Emerging research is beginning to show that managerial oversight enhances the rela-
tionship between firm acquisition experience and acquisition performance (Schijven et
al. 2017). Two broad motives drive acquisition behavior: value enhancement and pri-
vate interest. CEOs that pursue acquisitions and view them as opportunities to increase
firm value tend to argue for synergies, access to superior information, and/or attempts
to obtain market power. By contrast, personal interests such as increasing compensa-
tion, discretion, and bargaining power may also drive CEO acquisition decisions
(Devers et al. 2013). Recent work shows that where there are strong internal and exter-
nal governance mechanisms firms are more likely to have positive results from their ac-
quisition experience because those governance mechanisms compel managers to use
their acquisition experience for firm value enhancement (Schijven et al. 2017). As a re-
sult, firms should structure boards of directors that are independent of managerial in-
fluence, design CEO compensation that is heavily stock-based, and facilitate the
presence of institutional investors as monitoring mechanisms.
Facilitating top management team diversity
The quality of top management teams makes a difference as to whether the firm bene-
fits from its acquisition experience. Top management teams are directly involved in
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various stages of the acquisition process, such as target identification, negotiation and
price determination, and post-merger integration (Parola et al. 2015). Research also
shows that the composition of the top management team is a key determinant as to
how team members utilize prior firm acquisition experience. Top management team
tenure and educational heterogeneity have been shown to reduce the likelihood of
mis-transferring lessons from prior acquisitions and aid managers to optimize lessons
from acquisition experience (Nadolska and Barkema 2014). Specifically, diversity
among top management teams allows for sharing of different ideas and viewpoints,
thorough evaluation of multiple alternatives, and effective problem detection and solu-
tion (Cox et al. 1991; Wiersema and Bantel 1992), which leads to improved team effect-
iveness (Gruenfeld et al. 1996). As a result, a diverse top management team can
comprehensively compare various acquisitions, diligently identify the differences be-
tween them, and correctly transfer skills and experiences from prior acquisitions to
current ones. Indeed, top management team diversity positively moderates the impact
of prior acquisition experience on acquisition success. Hence, firms should actively try
to build heterogeneous top management teams that play a positive role in the relation-
ship between acquisition experience and acquisition performance.
Summary of the practices that facilitate and undermine firm ability to learn from ac-
quisition experience is presented in Table 1 below.
Conclusions
In sum, although prior research provides evidence that acquisition experience often has
a negative impact on acquisition performance, this negative impact can turn positive
(see Table 1).
Acquisitions are inherently complex strategic actions in which each acquisition is unique.
Accordingly, prior acquisition experience cannot be applied in a wholesale manner to a
current acquisition. However, key factors may appropriately generalize from one acquisition
to another. Prior research shows that such appropriate application of experience occurs more
frequently when a target is (a) more related to the acquirer’s industry (Haleblian and Finkel-
stein 1999) or (b) more similar to prior targets the acquirer has bought (Finkelstein and Hale-
blian 2002). Appropriate generalization of experience may also be more likely to occur when
the timing of acquisitions is sufficient for prior experience to be absorbed. The existence of
good governance mechanisms, such as independent boards and significant amount of shares
owned by the CEO and institutional investors, and quality top management team, such as
one with greater diversity, are also conditions in which acquisition experience is more likely to
yield positive outcomes. However, generalizing experience from external actors has not led to
expected benefits. Simply following the lead of other firms that also acquire, such as during
merger waves, or relying on the experience of experienced investment banks, does not con-
tribute to positive outcomes from acquisition experience. Thus, firms need to reflect on its
Table 1 Practices that facilitate and undermine firm ability to learn from acquisition experience
Practices facilitating successful learning Practices undermining successful learning
- Expanding time between acquisitions
- Drawing on strong governance mechanisms
- Facilitating top management team diversity
- Using similar-context acquisition experience
- Applying acquisition experience to dissimilar contexts
- Herding behaviors
- Relying blindly on financial advisor acquisition experience
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own acquisition experience with sufficient time to digest the experience in which differences
of opinion and careful oversight of the application of experience lead to the best outcomes.
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